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On Tuesday, November 18, 1760, King George III opened the first Par-
liament of his reign. In his speech from the throne the King said that he
looked "upon the Independence and Uprightness of Judges as essential to the
impartial Administration of Justice, as one of the best Securities of the Rights
and Liberties of his loving Subjects, and as most conducive to the Honour of
his Crown."'
On this point all of the Framers of the Constitution of 1787 agreed with
their former sovereign. George Washington wrote, "[t]he Judiciary System
should not only be independent in its operations, but as perfect as possible in
its formation."12 In The Federalist No. 47 James Madison wrote, "The ac-
cumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed,
or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."3 In Nos.
* An address delivered at the annual meeting of the Missouri Bar in Kansas City
on the two hundreth anniversary of the signing of the Constitution of the United
States, September 17, 1987. Revised October 1, 1987. Copyright @ 1987, William F.
Fratcher.
** R. B. Price Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Missouri-
Columbia. A.B., A.M., Wayne State University; J.D., LL.M., S.J.D., University of
Michigan.
1. Stat. 1 Geo. III, c. 23, Preamble (1760). The speech was probably written by
the Prime Minister, William Pitt.
2. Letter of April 3, 1790, to the Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States about to depart on their first circuit.
3. H. Dawson, ed., THE FEDERALIsT No. 47 (1888) (J. Madison); see also Jaffa,
What Were the "Original Intentions" of the Framers of the Constitution of the United
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48 and 51 he urged the need for checks and balances to insure that one branch
of government does not exceed its proper powers. 4 In No. 78, Colonel Alexan-
der Hamilton, quoting from Montesquieu, said, "there is no liberty if the pow-
ers of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive power," and
added, "The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essen-
tial in a limited constitution." 5
As Montesquieu well knew, the judiciary was not independent in France
and other countries which derived their legal systems from the Roman civil
law. In France a judge is a civil servant in the Ministry of Justice, appointed
upon graduation from law school, whose assignments, promotions and tenure
are dependent upon pleasing the Minister of Justice.6 Such judges are in no
position to oppose the unconstitutional tyranny of a Napoleon, an Adolf
Hitler, a Joseph Stalin, or a Latin American military dictator. The Framers
knew this and that England offered the best model of an independent judici-
ary. Five members of the Constitutional Convention were English barristers,
trained in the Inns of Court, and others, like John Adams, had studied the
position of English judges. What they sought was the English system, with
improvements designed to make it difficult for either the President or Congress
to interfere with the decision of cases by the federal courts. Those of you who
heard Mr. Justice White's address to the American Bar Association in San
Francisco last August will recall that he thinks that the Framers were right in
seeking such judicial independence and used proper methods to attain it.
King John agreed in Magna Carta in 1215 that he would appoint as jus-
tices "only such men as know the law of the realm and mean to observe it
well."'7 This promise was kept by his eighteenth century successors by ap-
pointing as judges of the superior courts only lawyers with long and successful
experience in practice who had become serjeants at law. 8 This meant that dis-
missal from his judicial position was not an economic disaster for a judge be-
cause he could make a good living in practice. In consequence, a threat of
dismissal was less likely to influence an English judge than it would be in the
case of a French judge, who has had no experience as a practising lawyer. No
doubt the Framers intended to continue the English rule of appointing judges
from among experienced practising lawyers. This was the practice in all of the
states. It was unnecessary to put it into the Constitution.
States?, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 351, 360 (1987); Kurland, The Rise and Fall of
the "'Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85 MicH. L. Ruv. 592 (1986); Blakesley, An
Essay on Executive Branch Attempts to Eviscerate the Separation of Powers, 1987
UTAH L. REV. 451.
4. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 48, 51 (J. Madison).
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 540 (A. Hamilton).
6. SAWER, Legal Profession, 10 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 779, 780-83 (15th
ed. 1974).
7. Magna Carta, ch. 45.
8. J. BAKER, THE ORDER OF SERJEANTS AT LAW 113 (1984); Sawer, supra note
6, at 780. There were only fourteen practising serjeants at law in 1775 but the King
could appoint a senior barrister serjeant in order to qualify him for a judgeship.
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2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss1/6
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
The Virginia Plan, presented to the Constitutional Convention on May
29, 1787, by Edmund Randolph, Governor of Virginia and former aide de
camp to General Washington, provided that judges should be chosen by Con-
gress, to hold office during good behavior and that their compensation should
not be increased or diminished while they held office." The New Jersey Plan,
presented on June 15 by William Paterson, provided that judges should be
appointed by the President, with the same tenure and compensation provisions
as the Virginia Plan.1" Benjamin Franklin opposed appointment by the Presi-
dent alone, saying that experience showed that caprice and the intrigues of
favorites and mistresses were the means most prevalent in monarchies. On
May 29 he suggested that the judges be chosen by the lawyers "who always
selected the ablest of the profession, in order to get rid of him, and share his
practice among themselves." James Madison favored appointment by the Sen-
ate. Tenure during good behavior and no change in compensation were agreed
to on May 29 and appointment by the Senate was accepted on June 13.11 On
July 18 Governeur Morris, with the support of Benjamin Franklin, moved to
delete the prohibition on increase in judges' salaries so that they could be ad-
justed to meet inflation. His motion carried. 2 On July 18 also Nathaniel
Gorham suggested that the appointment of judges by the executive, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, worked well in Massachusetts.18
Some of the Framers may have known that the Instrument of Government of
1653 and the draft English Constitution of 1655 provided that the chancellor
and the senior judges should be appointed by the Lord Protector [then Oliver
Cromwell] with the approbation of Parliament. 4 At any rate, the Convention
adopted on September 7 and 17, the provisions of Articles II and III that
judges are to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, to hold office during good behavior and to receive compen-
sation which shall not be diminished.1 5
An English statute enacted in 1328 provided that the King should not
disturb or delay common right by commands to the judges and that, if he did
so, "the justices shall not therefore leave to do Right in any Point."16 In 1616
9. A. PRESCOTT, DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 30 (1941).
10. Id. at 54.
11. Id. at 640, 659-61; S. PADOVER, THE GREAT DEBATES OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, ARRANGED ACCORDING TO Topics 400, 407-09 (1970).
These provisions were designed to prevent the evils described in the Declaration of
Independence, which asserted that King George III "has made judges dependent on his
Will alone for the Tenure of their offices, and the Amount and payment of their
Salaries."
12. A. PREscOTr, supra note 9, at 664-65.
13. Id. at 661.
14. S. GARDINER, CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION
1625-1660, at 416, 443 (3d ed. 1906).
15. A. PRESCOTr, supra note 9, at 671-72; T. NORTON, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES: ITS SOURCES AND ITS APPLICATION 133 (1922); U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
16. Stat. 2 Edw. III, c. 8 (1328). Stat. 18 Edw. III, Stat. 4 (1344), required the
1988]
3
Fratcher: Fratcher: Independence of the Judiciary
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
King James I summarily dismissed Sir Edward Coke as Lord Chief Justice of
England for refusal to obey the King's order to delay a case involving the
King's authorizing a bishop to hold several lucrative church positions at the
same time."7 This case might have produced revelations embarrassing to 'the
King. The King's dismissal of Coke to prevent public notoriety of the question-
able conduct of the King calls to mind the Saturday Night Massacre of Octo-
ber 20, 1973, when Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney
General William D. Ruckelshaus resigned to avoid complying with President
Nixon's order to fire Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. The Fram-
ers did not put the 1328 statute into the Constitution but they did see to it
that federal judges could not be summarily dismissed by presidents who did
not like their legal views, feared their investigation into presidential behavior,
or merely wanted to make partisan appointments to the bench.
Until 1689 the King usually appointed the Lord Chancellor and the jus-
tices of the courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas to serve during his
pleasure. He usually appointed the barons of the Court of Exchequer to serve
during good behavior. All of these judicial appointments expired on the death
of the King who made them.18 The King could remove a Lord Chancellor or a
justice without cause; he could remove a baron of the Exchequer with good
behavior tenure only by a judicial proceeding in the common law side of the
Court of Chancery on a writ of scire facias. This required a judicial determi-
nation of incompetence or misconduct.19 King James II abused his powers of
appointment and removal of judges to serve his own political ends. James was
deposed by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and his successors, King William
III and Queen Mary II, appointed justices of the common law courts to serve
during good behavior." An Act of Parliament of 1701 required this but au-
thorized the King to remove judges upon the address of both houses of Parlia-
ment." An Act of Parliament of 1760 provided that the commissions of judges
Justices to take an oath "that ye deny to no Man common Right by the King's Letters,
nor none other Man's, nor for none other Cause, and in case any Letters come to you
contrary to the Law, that ye do nothing by such Letters, but certify the King thereof,
and proceed to execute the Law, notwithstanding the same letters." Coke relied on the
1344 statute.
17. W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, at V, 439-40 (3d ed. 1945).
The case is Commendam Case; Colt v. Bishop of Coventry and Lichfield, 80 Eng. Rep.
290 (1616). See also J. TANNER, CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE REIGN OF
JAMES I, at 175 (1961). Coke relied on the 1344 statute briefly discussed supra in note
16.
18. W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, I, at 195 (7th ed. 1956).
19. W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, V, at 351 (3d ed. 1945); W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES, III, 47; Berger, Impeachment of Judges and "Good Behavior" Ten-
ure, 79 YALE L.J. 1475, 1480 (1970).
20. W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, VI, at 509-14 (2d ed. 1937); 9 ENCYCLO-
PAEDIA BRITANNICA 542 (11th ed. 1910).
21. Stat. 12 & 13 Will. III, c. 2, § 3 (1701); Berger, supra note 19, at 1477; 9
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 542 (11 th ed. 1910); W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, 1,
at 195 (7th ed. 1956); W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, VI, at 234 (2d ed. 1937).
[Vol. 53
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INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
should remain in effect notwithstanding the death of the King who appointed
them, that their salaries should continue as long as their commissions remain
in force, and continued the authorization for removal by the King upon the
address of both houses of Parliament.2 2 Probably because the Lord Chancellor
is not only a judge but also presiding officer of one house of the legislature, a
principal executive officer and a member of the Cabinet, he is still appointed
to serve during the pleasure of the Queen and may be removed by her without
cause.
The Framers of the Constitution carefully refrained from creating any
judicial office like that of the Lord Chancellor, whose incumbent could be re-
moved by the President without cause. On August 27, 1787, they defeated a
motion by John Dickinson of Delaware to permit removal of judges by the
President on application of both houses of Congress.23 The debate makes it
clear that this was done because they were aware that this method of removal
could be on purely political grounds and that it would weaken the indepen-
dence of the judiciary.
The Framers knew about the sad fate of Edward Hyde, Earl of Claren-
don, a distinguished jurist and historian, who was Lord Chancellor from 1658
to 1667. Many of us knew and respected his kinsman, Laurence Mastick
Hyde, Chief Justice of Missouri. Lord Chancellor Hyde seems to have advised
King Charles II to get rid of his principal mistress, Barbara Villiers. Barbara
contrived to get Hyde impeached for giving bad advice to the King on foreign
and military affairs. The King would not protect Hyde because the Lord
Chancellor had refused to help the King to get another woman for his collec-
tion. Hyde fled to France, whereupon he was condemned to perpetual exile by
bill of attainder.2 4 A bill of attainder is simply an Act of Parliament imposing
a punishment, which may include removal from office, imprisonment or death,
without conviction of any crime whatever. On August 22, 1787, Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts and James McHenry of Maryland moved to insert in
the Constitution a provision that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall
be passed. The motion carried on September 12.28
Hanging is an effective method of removing a judge from office. The
Framers knew about the attempt to end in this manner the career of Anthony
Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, an able lawyer who drafted and pushed
through Parliament the Habeas Corpus Act and became Lord Chancellor in
1672. English law then required indictment by a grand jury prior to trial for a
capital offense. Cooper angered the King by expressing reservations about the
22. Stat. 1 Geo. III, c. 23, §§ 1, 3 (1760); W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, I, at
195 (7th ed. 1956).
23. A. PRESCOTT, supra note 9, at 669-70.
24. J. CAMPBELL, LIvES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS, IV, 106-20 (4th ed. 1857);
A. WRIGHT & P. SMITH, PARLIAMENT PAST AND PRESENT, II, at 428 (1901); WEB-
STER's BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 752 (1964).
25. A. PRESCOTT, supra note 9, at 738-39; see also T. NORTON, supra note 15, at
84; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
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divine right of kings. He was arrested for high treason but the grand jury for
the County of Middlesex. refused to indict.2 6 The Framers also knew that the
English definition of treason was broad enough to suggest that a mere expres-
sion of opinion proved by a single witness would be enough for conviction.,
The Framers probably knew about the case of William Thorpe, Lord Chief
Justice of England, who was accused in 1350 of accepting bribes of 102 each
from defendants in criminal cases to delay their trials. Chief Justice Thorpe,
whose annual salary was about 50£, appears to have tripled his income in this
manner. King Edward III appointed an ad hoc commission of five members to
try and sentence Thorpe. The Chief Justice confessed his guilt and the com-
mission sentenced him to imprisonment and forfeiture of land and goods. The
King then issued a writ directing the commission to sentence Thorpe to death.
It did so. 28 Those of you who have served as judge advocates may remember
the similar case of Judge Advocate General Swaim in which President Chester
A. Arthur twice ordered a general court-martial to increase its sentence. 9 The
Framers did not see fit to bar criminal prosecution of judges in the regular
courts"0 but they narrowed the definition of treason and required two witnesses
to the same overt act to convict,31 guaranteed the right to trial by jury of all
crimes, except in cases of impeachment,3 2 and required an Act of Congress to
create a court."3 The Petition of Right of 1628, which King Charles I accepted
with reluctance, forbade the trial of civilians by ad hoc military commis-
sions." The Framers did not include this provision in the Constitution but the
Supreme Court ruled in Ex parte Milligan 5 that civilians may not be tried by
26. J. CAMPBELL, supra note 24, IV, at 220-27; A. WRIGHT & P. SMITH, supra
note 24, at 433.
27. Stat. 25 Edw. III, c. 2 (1350); W. HOLDSwORTH, supra note 17, III, at 287-
93 (5th ed. 1942); W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 17, VIII, at 307-21 (2d ed. 1937).
28. E. Foss, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE JUDGES OF ENGLAND 657
(1870); cf. J. CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND, I, at 90-92 (2d
ed. 1858). Thorpe was not hanged. The King relented and later appointed him a baron
of the Exchequer. For his salary as chief justice, see W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17,
I, at 256 (7th ed. 1956).
29. Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897); Fratcher, History of the
Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Army, 4 MIL. L. REv. 89, 98-99
(April 1959).
30. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974); United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1203 (1982); Catz, Removal of Federal Judges by Imprisonment, 18 RUTGERS LJ.
103 (1986); Annotation, Constitutional Issues Relating to Federal Criminal Prosecu-
tion of Federal Judges, 65 A.L.R. FED. 819 (1983).
31. A. PRESCOTT, supra note 9, at 742-47; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
32. A. PRESCOTT, supra note 9, at 741-42; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
33. A. PRESCOTT, supra note 9, at 654-58; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1.
34. Stat. 3 Car. I, c. 1 (1628). Stats. 16 Car. I, c. 10, 11 (1641) abolished the
courts of Star Chamber and High Commission, which had operated like military
commissions.
35. 71 U.S. (Wall.) 2 (1866); see also C. FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL
[Vol. 53
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INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
military commission when the civil courts are open. It is apparent, of course,
that the members of a military commission, whose assignments and promo-
tions are controlled by the President, lack the independence of judges of the
federal courts.
Although the Act of Parliament of 1701 required the judges in England
to be appointed to serve during good behavior, it did not extend to the colonies
and colonial judges were usually appointed to serve during the King's pleasure,
which meant that they could be removed summarily without cause. The King
did not always grant requests from colonial legislatures that he remove a royal
governor or chief justice. American lawyers knew that in England a judge or
executive officer could be removed from office, without the concurrence of the
King, if impeached for an offense by the House of Commons and convicted by
the House of Lords. The colonial legislatures tried to do likewise in the cases
of Governor John Harvey of Virginia in 1635, Chief Justice Nicholas More of
Pennsylvania in 1681, Chief Justice Nicholas Trott of South Carolina in 1719,
Chief Justice William Smith of North Carolina in 1738, Chief Justice Freder-
ick Smyth of New Jersey in 1767, and, most importantly, Chief Justice Peter
Oliver of Massachusetts in 1773. None of these attempts succeeded because
the Privy Council ruled that the colonial legislatures did not have the im-
peachment powers of Parliament. John Adams, who had been active in the
effort to oust Oliver, had studied the history of such proceedings in Parliament
written by the great English legal historian, John Selden. Adams drafted im-
peachment provisions for the Massachusetts Constitution and provided drafts
for those of Pennsylvania and Virginia. By 1787 eleven states had such provi-
sions, all based on the Adams drafts, which would limit impeachment to per-
sons holding public office and limit the punishment to removal from and dis-
qualification for such office3 6
Some of the Framers remembered the impeachment trial of Lord Chan-
cellor Thomas Parker in 1725, they had all heard of those of Lord Chief Jus-
tice William Scroggs in 168 13 and Lord Chancellor Francis Bacon in 1621,
and they had access to information about the trial of Lord Chief Justice Rob-
ert Tresilian in 1388. It is likely that the excesses committed in those proceed-
ings influenced the Framers in restricting the impeachment power in the Con-
stitution. In November, 1386, King Richard II, who was nineteen years old
and a prisoner held by a group of power-hungry noblemen (who might be
RULE 38 (2d ed. 1943).
36. P. HOFFER & N. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA 1635-1805, at 10-11, 16,
21, 25, 30, 35-37, 41-44, 46-47, 49-51 (1984). Selden's book, OF THE JUDICATURE OF
PARLIAMENTS (C. 1626), sprang from his employment by the House of Lords as adviser
in connection with the impeachment trial of Lord Chancellor Francis Bacon. C. TITE,
IMPEACHMENT AND PARLIAMENTARY JUDICATURE IN EARLY STUART ENGLAND 143,
233 (1974).
37. J. CAMPBELL, supra note 28, II, at 19-22; W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17,
VI, at 506-07 (1937). Scroggs was charged with high treason consisting, inter alia, of
suppressing a newspaper and punishing its editor for libel. The trial ceased when the
King dissolved Parliament and dismissed Scroggs.
1988]
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called the "Gang of Five"), signed an instrument transferring most of the
royal powers to the Gang of Five for a year, after they had reminded him of
how his great-grandfather, King Edward II, was deposed and tortured to
death. At that time it was customary for the King and the House of Lords to
seek advisory opinions from the judges. Richard escaped from the Gang of
Five and sought an opinion from Lord Chief Justice Tresilian and five other
royal judges as to the validity of the instrument that he had signed. They
advised him that he was not bound by the instrument. When Parliament met
in 1388 it was dominated by the Gang of Five. Tresilian was absent but the
other judges were in their places, ready to advise the House of Lords. They
were arrested and all six judges were charged with giving the advisory opinion
to the King. The Justices, Serjeants and Advocates present advised the House
that this was not an offense under either the English common law or the Ro-
man civil law. The House of Lords, without witnesses or evidence, sentenced
Tresilian to be hanged naked at what is now Marble Arch and the other five
judges to exile for life in remote Irish villages. 8 All for giving an honest and
correct legal opinion to their King. The Framers would not have wanted to
encourage this parody of impeachment.
Prior to the appointment of Sir Thomas More in 1529, the Lord Chancel-
lor was usually a bishop with a large church income. The King paid him only
nominal compensation, such as robes, candles and wine.39 Secular lawyers who
had no church income could not maintain the standard of living expected of a
Lord Chancellor, the highest secular officer under the King, without some
source of funds. A custom grew up of litigants giving the Lord Chancellor
"gifts," usually after their cases were decided. In 1621 the House of Commons
impeached the Lord Chancellor, Francis Bacon, Viscount St. Albans, for re-
ceiving such gifts. In one instance he accepted a gift of a hundred pounds
sterling before deciding the case and then decided against the donor. Bacon
admitted guilt and was sentenced by the House of Lords to removal from of-
fice, disqualification for public office, banishment fom the King's court, a forty
thousand pound fine and imprisonment during the King's pleasure. King
James I released Bacon from the Tower of London after two days, remitted
the fine and banishment, and gave him a pension of twelve hundred pounds a
38. COBBETT'S STATE TRIALS, I, at 90, 113-21 (1809); D. HuME, HISTORY OF
ENGLAND, II, at 9-12 (1828). The five judges exiled to Ireland were Chief Justice
Robert Belknap of the Court of Common Pleas, Chief Baron John Carey of the Court
of Exchequer, Mr. Justice John Lokton of the Court of King's Bench, and Justices
John Holt and William Burgh of the Court of Common Pleas. The proceeding against
these five was clearly an impeachment by the House of Commons. That against
Tresilian was technically an appeal of treason, a type of proceeding abolished by Stat.
1 Hen. IV, c. 14 (1400). See W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, II, at 361 (4th ed.
1936).
39. J. BALDWIN, THE KING'S COUNCIL IN ENGLAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES
175 (1913); W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, V, at 218 (3d ed. 1945); D. STENTON,
ENGLISH SOCIETY IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES 20-21, 31-33, 51-52 (1951).
[Vol. 53
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year °0
By 1700 new methods of securing income for the Lord Chancellor had
been developed. He received substantial New Year's gifts from the officials of
the Chancery and the lawyers practising there and he charged from five to six
thousand pounds for appointment as a master in chancery. Each master man-
aged large sums of money deposited in court or belonging to infants or lunat-
ics. The masters were permitted to invest these funds and keep the income,
thus reimbursing themselves for the amounts paid for their appointments. 1
Many of you will have noted that this method of financing the judiciary re-
sembles the I.O.T.A. scheme adopted in Florida, Missouri and other states,
under which the interest on clients' funds is diverted from the clients and paid
over to the state bar organization. 42 When Lord Cowper became Lord Chan-
cellor in 1705 he abolished the New Year's gifts. Payments for appointments
as masters in chancery continued during Cowper's incumbency and after
Thomas Parker, Lord Parker, became Lord Chancellor in 1718. Some of the
masters seem to have exchanged government bonds, in which funds in their
custody were invested, for stock in the South Sea Company. This stock rose in
price from a hundred pounds a share to over a thousand before August, 1720,
and dropped to nothing the next month .4 Several of the masters in chancery
became insolvent and one ran away. The guardian of the Dowager Duchess of
Montague, a lunatic, commenced a proceeding to recover funds lost by his
ward. The Prince of Wales, who had been angered by a decision of Lord
Parker that the King was entitled to the custody and education of the prince's
children, had one of his friends commence impeachment proceedings against
Parker, now Earl of Macclesfield, for "high crimes and misdemeanors."
Parker admitted receiving gifts from masters appointed by him and pleaded
custom as a defense. After a thirteen-day trial, the House of Lords sentenced
him to a fine of thirty thousand pounds, to be used to reimburse persons whose
40. C. TITE, supra note 36, at 110-17; A. WRIGHT & P. SMITH, supra note 24,
II, at 425-26. In the twelfth century it was customary for successful litigants in the
royal courts to make substantial gifts to the King, the Queen and royal officials. D.
STENTON, supra note 39, at 38.
41. A. WRIGHT & P. SMITH, supra note 24, at 440 et seq. Stat. 5 & 6 Edw. VI,
c. 16, § 1 (1552), prohibited sale of judicial offices but excluded those held in fee
simple (§ 3) and those appointed by the Chief Justices of the Courts of King's Bench
and Common Pleas (§ 6). W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, I, at 246, 252, 255, 259,
262, 440 (7th ed. 1956). The Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas con-
trolled appointments to twenty judicial offices for which he was free to charge. Parker
had been Chief Justice of the Common Pleas before he received the Great Seal and
Chief Justice King of the Court of Common Pleas presided over his impeachment trial.
It should be recalled that commissions in the Army were sold until the latter half of the
nineteenth century.
42. Marcotte, Big Interest in Small Change, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1987, at 70 (dis-
cussing Cone v. The Florida Bar, pending in the United States Court of Appeals for
the 11 th Circuit).
43. South Sea Bubble, NEw COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2577 (1975); STORY OF
THE BRITISH NATION, III, at 1173 (W. Hutchinson ed., c. 1916).
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funds were lost by the masters, and to imprisonment in the Tower of London
until the fine was paid. With the King's help, Parker raised the money in six
weeks.44 His successor and later Lord Chancellors were given higher salaries,
which enabled them to maintain a suitable standard of living without gifts
from litigants, lawyers or masters in chancery.
John Adams, who had studied the English precedents, provided Colonel
George Mason with a draft of impeachment provisions for the Virginia Consti-
tution.4 5 When he was Governor of Virginia in 1781, Thomas Jefferson nar-
rowly escaped impeachment for mishandling of the militia and conscription.46
In 1783 he proposed a requirement of a two-thirds majority for conviction on
impeachment.47 The Virginia Plan, presented to the Constitutional Convention
on May 29, 1787, and the New Jersey Plan, presented on June 15, called for
the trial of impeachments by a federal court; Colonel Hamilton's plan,
presented on June 18, would have impeachments for "mal and corrupt con-
duct" tried by a court consisting of all of the state chief justices who had good
behavior tenure.4' As late as August 6 the Framers contemplated trial of im-
peachments by the Supreme Court'9 but on August 22 they decided upon trial
by the Senate.50 On September 4 they decided that conviction should require a
two-thirds majority.5 1 This requirement served two purposes: First, it reduced
the danger of removals based on purely partisan political grounds, which
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton feared.5 2 Second, in view of the
equal representation of the states in the Senate, it ensured that convictions
would be by the representatives of a majority of the people of the United
States.
As indicated by its action in the Tresilian case,53 the House of Lords
treated as a ground for impeachment anything it chose. The Framers sought
44. J. CAMPBELL, supra note 24, VI, at 18-19, 33-50; A. WRIGHT & P. SMITH,
supra note 24, II, at 440 et seq.
45. P. HoFnR & N. HULL, supra note 36, at 64-65.
46. Id. at 85.
47. Id. at 71-72. The New York Constitution of 1777 and the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780 required a two-thirds majority for conviction on impeachment. Id.
at 97.
48. S. PADOVER, supra note 11, at 53, 84, 99-100; P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra
note 36, at 97-98; A. PREScorr, supra note 9, at 50, 54, 78.
49. A. PRESCOTT, supra note 9, at 774; P. HOFPER & N. HULL, supra note 36, at
98.
50. A. PRESCOTT, supra note 9, at 466, 774; P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note
36, at 50.
51. A. PRESCOTT, supra note 9, at 466; P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 36, at
102-06.
52. Hamilton and Madison would have preferred trial by a judicial tribunal, but
neither opposed ratification of the Constitution on this ground. A. PRESCOTT, supra
note 9, at 775-76; THE FEDERALIST Nos. 65, 79, 81 (A. Hamilton); P. HOFFER & N.
HULL, supra note 36, at 99-100.
53. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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to define impeachable offenses. They considered "mal and corrupt conduct,"' '
"malpractice or neglect of duty,"55 "treason, bribery or corruption,"" "neglect
of duty, malversation or corruption," 57 "treason or bribery,"" and "treason,
bribery or maladministration,"" and finally agreed, on September 8, on
"Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors,"6 The last
phrase, it will be recalled, was used in the impeachment of Lord Chancellor
Parker in 1725.
In England anyone could be impeached and some of the cases mentioned,
including those of Lord Chief Justice Tresilian and Lord Chancellor Parker,
were against persons who had already been dismissed from office. Moreover,
there were no restrictions on the punishments imposable. Tresilian was sen-
tenced to death for writing a judicial opinion which the current majority in the
House of Lords did not like. All of the American state constitutional provi-
sions restricted impeachment to persons presently holding office and limited
the punishment to removal from office and disqualification for public office.
The debates in the Constitutional Convention assumed that impeachment
would be so limited and it was.61
In England the King could not block an impeachment by pardon but he
could pardon after judgment, so that the convicted person would not be
hanged, imprisoned or forced to pay a fine.6" The Framers deprived the Presi-
dent of all power to pardon in cases of impeachment 63 This raises question as
to whether there is any way to modify a sentence of disqualification from hold-
ing public office. Could it be done by Act of Congress?
All of the justices and judges appointed by Presidents Washington and
John Adams were Federalists. The Federal Pension Act of 1792 required jus-
tices of the Supreme Court to pass initially on veterans' applications for pen-
sions, with appeal to the Secretary of War. Chief Justice John Jay and Mr.
Justice James Wilson refused to do this work on the ground that appeal from
the Supreme Court to the Secretary of War was unconstitutional. There was
54. See sources cited supra note 48.
55. A. PRESCOTT, supra note 9, at 774 (July 26, 1787).
56. Id. (August 6, 1787).
57. Id. (August 20, 1787).
58. Id. at 775 (September 4, 1787).
59. Id. (September 8, 1787).
60. Id. (September 8, 1787); P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 36, at 97, 101-
02.
61. P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 36, at 96.
62. Stat. 12 & 13 Will. III, c. 2, § 3 (1701). This made statutory the rule laid
down by the House of Lords in the Earl of Danby's Case, 11 State Tr. 600 (H.L.
1685). See Regina v. Boyes, I B. & S. 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (1861).
63. A. PRESCOTT, supra note 9, at 652; U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (President
may pardon, except in cases of impeachment); U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (House of
Representatives to have sole power of impeachment); U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cls. 6, 7
(Senate to try impeachments and convict on two-thirds majority); U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 4 (grounds for impeachment).
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some agitation for their impeachment but the House of Representatives did
not impeach." The Republican Party won the White House and majorities in
both houses of Congress in the election of 1800. The new Republican Presi-
dent, Thomas Jefferson, promptly dismissed all of the United States attorneys
and marshals appointed by Washington and Adams. Then he started on the
federal judges. The Judiciary Act of February 13, 1801, provided for the ap-
pointment of sixteen United States circuit judges and some additional district
judges. 5 President Adams made these appointments, after confirmation by the
Senate, before his term expired on March 3, 1801. This act was repealed by
the Republicans in 1802, they having a majority of one in the Senate. This left
the judges appointed in 1801 without jobs. Some of them had vacated appoint-
ments as district judges by accepting the new circuit judgeships. Some of them
petitioned Congress for their pay but they never received it. Chief Justice
Marshall thought that the deprivation of their offices and salaries was uncon-
stitutional but there appeared to be no remedy.66 This episode suggests that
the President and a bare majority in each house of Congress could remove all
of the federal circuit and district judges by abolishing their courts. As those of
you who studied Marbury v. Madison67 in law school know, President Jeffer-
son saw to it that judicial commissions signed by President Adams but still in
the office of the Secretary of State on March 4, 1801, were not delivered.
President Jefferson did not attempt to oust all of the district judges by
abolishing their courts but he did have a hand in the impeachment of John
Pickering, a United States district judge who had been Chief Justice of New
Hampshire. By a 45 - 8 vote the House of Representatives impeached him for
improper exclusion of evidence in an admiralty case, improper dismissal of the
case, and swearing while drunk on the bench. One of the managers for the
House, John Randolph of Roanoke, Virginia, argued that the House could
define impeachable offenses as it wished, saying that tenure during good be-
havior only protected judges from removal by the President.68 This argument
would mean that all of the Federalist judges could be removed merely because
they were Federalists. Vice President Aaron Burr presided over the trial in the
Senate. Judge Pickering did not appear, in person or by counsel. He did chal-
64. P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 36, at 142.
65. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, §§ 6 & 7, 2 Stat. 89, 90-91 (1801). This legisla-
tion had been recommended by President Washington. By providing circuit judges it
eliminated the need for Supreme Court justices to ride circuit. The circuit riding was
so arduous that older men could not accept appointments to the court or remain on it.
Travel by horseback from the District of Columbia to Maine or South Carolina and
back twice a year was not easy even for strong young men. C. HAINES, THE ROLE OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1789-1835, at 148-49
(1900).
66. Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132 (1802) (effective July 1, 1802);
see also C. HAINES, supra note 65, at 42, 149, 177, 180-81, 223-24, 227, 237, 241-42
(1900).
67. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch 137) 368 (1803).
68. P. HOFFER & N. HULL, supra note 36, at 189.
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lenge President Jefferson to a duel, saying that he was entitled to trial by
battle. A Federalist senator tried to stop the trial by presenting an affidavit
made by Judge Pickering's son saying that his father was insane. Pickering
was convicted and removed from office on a largely partisan vote.69
President Jefferson's next target was Samuel Chase, who had been ap-
pointed Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court by President
Washington in 1796. Before and during the American Revolution it had be-
come common for judges to deliver patriotic speeches to grand juries. Chase
delivered a Federalist speech, crticizing the Republican administration, to a
grand jury in Maryland in 1803. He was impeached for this and for improper
rulings in the trial for treason of a man named Fries who had led a riot in
Pennsylvania. Mr. Justice Chase contended that impeachment lay only for in-
dictable offenses and that a mere error in judgment, without corrupt motives,
is not such an offense. President Jefferson, to his credit, let it be known that a
vote for acquittal would not be considered disloyal to him. The Senate voted
18 to 16 to convict on two of eight counts. One charged refusal to excuse a
juror in the Fries case who had formed an opinion of guilt. The other charged
refusal to allow a witness to testify for the defense of Fries on one count
against him. As there was not a two-thirds majority for conviction, Mr. Justice
Chase was acquitted and remained in office until his death in 1811.10 He deliv-
ered no more Federalist speeches to grand juries. His acquittal seems to have
stopped attempts to oust judges merely because they belonged to a political
party which lacked a majority in both houses of Congress.
The next significant judicial impeachment was that of James Hawkins
Peck, United States District Judge for the District of Missouri. Judge Peck,
who had moved to St. Louis from Tennessee, was appointed to the bench by
President Monroe in 1822. He presided over the trial of Soulard v. United
States, in which the plaintiff, represented by a St. Louis lawyer named Luke
E. Lawless, was trying to prove title by a Spanish land grant.7' Lawless was on
good terms with Senator Thomas Hart Benton. Judge Peck ruled that the
grant had not been adequately proved. He took the unusual step of publishing
his opinion in an anti-Benton St. Louis newspaper, The Republican, on March
30, 1826. Mr. Lawless then published a letter in the Enquirer, a pro-Benton
St. Louis paper, suggesting errors in Judge Peck's ruling. I have read the let-
ter. It was merely a list of errors of the sort that might be put into an appel-
late brief. Judge Peck summarily convicted Lawless of contempt and sen-
tenced him to twenty-four hours in jail and to be suspended from practice for
eighteen months. As Lawless had some seventy Spanish land grant cases pend-
ing in the district court, the suspension from practice was a severe punishment.
The Supreme Court reversed Judge Peck's judgment in the Soulard case 2 and
69. Id. at 207-17.
70. Id. at 228-55.
71. Soulard's Heirs v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet. 100) 31 (1836).
72. Id. at 33.
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the House of Representatives, led by James Buchanan, Chairman of the Judi-
ciary Committee, impeached Judge Peck by a vote of 123 - 49 for "high mis-
demeanors." Vice President John C. Calhoun presided at the trial before the
Senate. Congressman McDuffie for the managers argued that summary pun-
ishment for contempt is limited to acts in the presence of the court interfering
with the administration of justice. That is the present Missouri rule but the
question was in doubt here until 1941 .7 William Wirt, Attorney General of
the United States, who was also representing the United States in the appeal
of the Soulard case, defended Judge Peck. The testimony revealed that Judge
Peck always blindfolded himself before sitting in court in Jefferson City. It
also revealed that Lawless, who was reputed to be a crack shot, had offered to
withdraw the charges if Peck, whose eyesight was notoriously poor, would
fight a duel with him. If Judge Peck had accepted the challenge, President
Andrew Jackson would probably have had a vacancy in the office of United
States district judge to fill. Twenty one Jacksonian Democrats voted for con-
viction. The two Jacksonian Democrat senators from Tennessee voted for ac-
quittal, thus indicating that President Jackson was not treating the vote as a
matter of party loyalty. All twenty of the Whigs and other non-Jacksonian
Democrats in the Senate voted to acquit. Senator Benton, who testified for the
prosecution, did not vote. Ex-President John Quincy Adams said that it was
almost a party vote. James Buchanan pushed through an Act of Congress to
restrict the contempt power.7 4
The 1804 decision in the case of Mr. Justice Chase indicates that a judge
will not be removed from office by impeachment merely because he belongs to
a political party that is in the minority in both houses of Congress. The 1831
decision in the case of Judge Peck indicates that a judge will not be removed
from office by impeachment merely because he makes an honest mistake of
law. Together, these cases indicate that the Framers of the Constitution
achieved their goal of providing an independent judiciary, able to protect the
liberties of the people. The federal judge who eschews liquor and profanity
while on the bench need not fear the awful fate of Lord Chief Justice
Tresilian.
73. State ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Coleman, Judge, 347 Mo. 1239,
1256-59, 152 S.W.2d 640, 646-48 (1941).
74. Bushnell, The Impeachment and Trial of James H. Peck, 74 Mo. HIsT. R13v.
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